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We study how stability can be maintained even aer any set of at most k players leave their groups, in
the context of hedonic games. While stability properties ensure an outcome to be robust against players’
deviations, it has not been considered how an unexpected change caused by a sudden deletion of players
aects stable outcomes. In this paper, we propose a novel criterion that reshapes stability form robustness
aspect. We observe that some stability properties can be no longer preserved even when a single agent is
removed. However, we obtain positive results by focusing on symmetric friend-oriented hedonic games. We
prove that we can eciently decide the existence of robust outcomes with respect to Nash stability under
deletion of any number of players or contractual individual stability under deletion of a single player. We also
show that symmetric additively separable games always admit an individual stable outcome that is robust
with respect to individual rationality.
1 INTRODUCTION
Coalition formation is everywhere in human activities. Companies group their employers into
project teams. Countries form coalitions to promote international trade among them. Individuals
interact with each other and form groups in order to achieve objectives they cannot seek for on
their own.
Hedonic coalition formation games (for short, hedonic games), introduced by Bogomolnaia and
Jackson [2002] and Banerjee et al. [2001], provide an elegant framework to formulate coalition
formation. In these games, each player has preferences over the coalitions to which she or he
belongs, and desirable outcomes oen correspond to stable partitions. e basic intuition behind
stable partitioning is that group structures need to be robust under certain changes within the
system; that is, outcomes must be immune to players’ coalitional or individual deviations to other
coalitions. Stability can prevent internal conicts among members of a coalition, or it can help us
nurture the relationship among members of a project team.
In many real-world scenarios, however, groups may encounter unexpected changes and chal-
lenges, imposed from the outside of the system. For instance, a certain country can go bankrupt and
be enforced to leave a political alliance. In this respect, a group structure that satises a standard
stability requirement can become immediately unstable due to unexpected circumstances. A case
in point is a political coalition of three countries with one intermediate country connecting two
other countries who are enemies to each other: if the intermediate player happens to disappear
from the coalition, one cannot maintain the stability of the whole system.
In this paper, we propose a novel criterion that redenes stability from robustness aspect. We
dene an outcome to be robust with respect to a certain stability requirement α if removing any set
of at most k players still preserves α . Besides the preceding example of a political alliance, there
are several applications of hedonic games, such as project team formation [Okimoto et al., 2015],
research team formation [Alcalde and Revilla, 2004], and group activity selection [Darmann et al.,
2017], in which unexpected players’ non-participation may severely aect stability of the system.
To the best of our knowledge, however, no aempt has been ever made to connect two important
considerations, robustness and stability. Our goal is to make the rst step lling this gap.
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NS-robustness poly time (Cor. 4.3)
IS-robustness NP-complete (k = 1) (. 5.8)
CIS-robustness poly time (k = 1) (. 5.6)
NP-complete (k = 2) (. 5.7)
IS & IR-robustness exists and polytime (. 6.2)
Table 1. Overview of our complexity results in a symmetric friend-oriented game, where k is the maximum
number of players who can leave the entire game.
Our contribution We focus on friend-oriented games, introduced by Dimitrov et al. [2006],
where players’ preferences are succinctly encoded via the binary friendship relations. While it
is known that such games always guarantee the existence of stable outcomes, we observe that a
simple example of one player connecting two enemies shows impossibility in maintaining most of
the stability properties, such as core stability, Nash stability, individual stability, and contractual
individual stability. Not surprisingly, this negative result holds even under a very small change of
the system, i.e., only a single player can disappear.
Given these non-existence results, we investigate the computational complexity of deciding
the existence of a robust outcome in a symmetric friend-oriented game. Specically, we show
that we can eciently decide the existence of an outcome that is robust with respect to Nash
stability, irrespective of the number of players leaving the game. We then prove that any symmetric
friend-oriented game admits a polynomial time algorithm that nds a robust outcome with respect
to contractual individual stability in case of removing a single player. To this end, we obtain
a non-trivial characterization of games whose corresponding robust outcomes are non-empty.
Moreover, we complement this result by showing that the problem becomes NP-hard when k = 2.
We also show that the positive results do not extend to an intermediate stability property, individual
stability: we prove that the associated problem for individual stability is NP-hard even when only a
single player is allowed to leave.
Finally, we consider the question of whether a minimum stability requirement, individual ratio-
nality, can be maintained while ensuring that an outcome of a game itself satises stronger stability
desiderata. It turns out that when players have symmetric additively separable preferences, an
individually stable partition which is robust with respect to individual rationality always exist. Our
complexity results are summarized in Table 1.
Related work Several papers considered robustness against agent failures in the context of co-
operative games. Bachrach et al. [2011] proposed the reliability extension of cooperative games
where each agent has an independent failure probability. is probabilistic model has been also
applied to subclasses of cooperative games, such as totally-balanced games [Bachrach et al., 2012],
weighted voting games [Bachrach and Shah, 2013], and cooperative max-games [Bachrach et al.,
2014]. Okimoto et al. [2015] introduced the concept of k-robustness for team formation problems;
under their denition, each team still needs to accomplish their task even aer k agents fail.
Crudely, two dierent approaches deal with cooperative games with uncertainty. One is the
Bayesian approach assuming a known prior over agent capabilities [Chalkiadakis and Boutilier, 2004,
Chalkiadakis et al., 2007, Myerson, 2007]. Another approach, initiated by Balcan et al. [2015], is to
apply the PAC (probably approximately correct) learning model to cooperative games. Specically,
Balcan et al. [2015] studied the learnability of probable stable payos, given random samples of
coalitions, which has been extended to hedonic games
Our work is also related to the rich body of the literature on the study of hedonic games.
Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] and Banerjee et al. [2001] were the rst to model hedonic coalition
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formation games in which players’ preferences solely depend on the members of each coalition.
Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] considered various possibilities of players’ deviations, which gives
rise to dierent concepts of stability outcomes. Several important subclasses of hedonic games
have been later proposed, including additively separable hedonic games (ASHGs) [Bogomolnaia
and Jackson, 2002], friend and enemy oriented games [Dimitrov et al., 2006], fractional hedonic
games [Aziz et al., 2017, 2014], to name a few.
Several works explored the relation between stability and the networks capturing agents’ pref-
erences, in which the nodes of a graph represent players and edges correspond to the degree of
preference. Bilo` et al. [2014] analyzed the ratio between the social welfare of a Nash stable outcome
and social optimum in fractional hedonic games, for dierent topologies such as bipartite graphs
and trees. In a more general seing, Peters [2016] introduced graphical hedonic games and obtained
a number of computational complexity results of stability outcomes for the case when the graph
describing agents’ preferences has a bounded treewidth. Igarashi and Elkind [2016] used a dierent
approach and considered hedonic games where players are located on a graph and coalitions are
only allowed to form if they are connected in this graph; they proved both existence and complexity
results of some stability concepts on acyclic graphs.
Our denition of robustness is arguably the most stringent requirement one could aim for, as
it requires an outcome to be immune to any possibility of deterministic agent failure. However,
the denition resembles some graph connectivity concepts, such as the k-vertex-connectivity,
capturing the robustness of a given network (see, e.g., Schrijver [2003]). We also note that the
notion of robustness in a stable matching is fundamentally dierent from ours. For instance, Kojima
[2011] considers instability that results from agents’ manipulation; a mechanism is considered to
be robustly stable if it is strategy-proof and immune to a blocking pair before and aer an agent
misrepresents her preference. is does not take into account the possibility of making the system
unstable due to agent failures.
2 PRELIMINARIES
For a natural number s ∈ N, we write [s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}. A hedonic game is dened as a pair
(N , (i )i ∈N ) where N = [n] is a nite set of players and each i is a preference over the subsets of
N (also referred to as coalitions); specically for every i ∈ N , we let Ni denote the collection of all
coalitions containing i; each i describes a complete and transitive preference over the sets in Ni .
Let i denote the strict preference derived from i , i.e., S i T if S i T , butT i S . For i ∈ N and
S,T ∈ Ni , we say that player i strictly prefers a coalition S to another coalition T if S i T ; player i
weakly prefers S to T if S i T . We call a coalition S ⊆ N individually rational if every player i ∈ S
weakly prefers S to {i}.
A preference prole (i )i ∈N is said to be additively separable if there exists a weight function
w : N × N → R≥0 such that for each i ∈ N and each S,T ∈ Ni we have S i T if and only if∑
j ∈S w(i, j) ≥
∑
j ∈T w(i, j) [Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002]; we will assume that w(i, i) = 0 for
each i ∈ N . An additively separable preference is said to be symmetric if the weight function
w : N × N → R≥0 is symmetric, i.e., w(i, j) = w(j, i) for all i, j ∈ N . We use the notation (N ,w)
to denote an additively separable game with weight function w : N × N → R≥0. For additively
separable games, each player can consider every other player to be either a friend, a neutral player,
or an enemy; specically, for each pair of distinct players i, j ∈ N , we say that j is a friend of i if
w(i, j) > 0, and j is an enemy of i if w(i, j) < 0.
Dimitrov et al. [2006] introduced a subclass of additively separable preferences, which they
called friend-oriented preferences. Under friend-oriented preferences, each player has strong favour
towards her friends: w(i, j) ∈ {n,−1} for each i, j ∈ N with i , j. For a symmetric additively
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separable game (N ,w), let Gw denote the friendship graph where the set of vertices is given by the
set of players and two players i, j are adjacent if and only if they are friends; each coalition S is said
to have minimum degree t if each player in S has at least t other friends in S .
An outcome of a hedonic game is a partition of players into disjoint coalitions. Given a partition
pi of N and a player i ∈ N , let pi (i) denote the unique coalition in pi that contains i . Much of
the existing literature is concerned with outcomes that satisfy certain stability requirements. A
minimum stability property we require is individual rationality. A partition pi of N is said to be
individually rational (IR) if each player prefers their coalition to staying alone, i.e., all coalitions
in pi are individually rational. If we extend this to a group deviation, we obtain the denition of
the core. Specically, a coalition S ⊆ N strongly blocks a partition pi of N if every player i ∈ S
strictly prefers S to her own coalition pi (i). A partition pi of N is said to be core stable (CR) if no
coalition S ⊆ N strongly blocks pi . We also consider deviations based on individual movements.
Specically, consider a player i ∈ N and a pair of coalitions S < Ni , T ∈ Ni . A player j ∈ S
accepts a deviation of i to S if j weakly prefers S ∪ {i} to S ; a player j ∈ T accepts a deviation of
i to S if j weakly prefers T \ {i} to T . A deviation of i from T to S is an NS-deviation if i strictly
prefers S ∪ {i} to T , an IS-deviation if it is an NS-deviation and all players in S accept it, and a
CIS-deviation if it is an IS-deviation and all players inT accept it. A partition pi is called Nash stable
(NS) (respectively, individually stable (IS) and contractually individually stable (CIS)) if no player
i ∈ N has an NS-deviation (respectively, an IS-deviation and a CIS-deviation) from pi (i) to another
coalition S ∈ pi or to ∅.
Trivially, Nash stability implies individual stability, which also implies contractually individual
stability. Usually, core stability does not imply the stability based on individual deviations. However,
we note that for a symmetric friend-oriented game, core stability implies individual stability.
Lemma 2.1. For a symmetric friend-oriented game (N ,w), if a partition pi is core stable, then pi is
individually stable.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that pi is core stable but does not satisfy individual
stability. en, there is a player i who has an IS-deviation to some coalition S ∈ pi . is means that
i strictly prefers S ∪ {i} to pi (i), and i and every player in S are friends to each other. us, the
players S ∪ {i} strongly block pi , a contradiction. 
We also note that contractual individual stability does not normally imply individual rationality
as a player’s deviation under the stability concept needs to be approved by the members of her
coalition. With symmetric friend-oriented preferences, nevertheless, the implication holds.
Lemma 2.2. For a symmetric friend-oriented game (N ,w), if a partition pi is contractually individu-
ally stable, then pi is individually rational.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that pi is contractually individually stable but does not
satisfy individual rationality. en, there is a player i who strictly prefers {i} to his own coalition
pi (i). is means that pi (i) contains at least two players and every other player j ∈ pi (i) \ {i} is an
enemy of i . us, i has a CIS-deviation to the emptyset, a contradiction. 
3 AGENT FAILURE IN HEDONIC GAMES
Earlier we dened the robustness informally: A sudden deletion of players upon an outcome should
preserve the property it has achieved before. We are now in a position to make the denition more
formal. For each S ⊆ N and i ∈ N , we denote by i |S the preference relation restricted to Ni ∩ 2S .
Denition 3.1. Given α ∈ {CR,NS,IS,CIS, IR} and a natural number k > 0, a partition pi is said to
be α-robust under deletion of at most k players if pi satises the property α , and for any S ⊆ N
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with |S | ≤ k , the partition pi−S := { S ′ \ S | S ′ ∈ pi } still satises the property α in the subgame
(N \S, (i |N \S )i ∈N \S ). When k is clear from the context, we will simply call such partition α-robust.
By denition, if an outcome is α-robust under deletion of k + 1 players, then it is α-robust
under deletion of any ` ≤ k players. Also, xing parameter k , the relations between the above
robustness concepts are the same as those among the corresponding stability concepts. Namely, we
have the following containment relation among the classes of outcomes: NS-robust ⊆ IS-robust ⊆
CIS-robust ∩ IR-robust, and CR-robust ⊆ IR-robust. Also, by Lemma 2.2, CR-robustness implies
IS-robustness and CIS-robustness implies IR-robustness for a symmetric friend-oriented game.
It is known that a stable outcome of a symmetric friend-oriented game is guaranteed to exist and
can be found in polynomial time: a partition that divides the players into the connected components
satises the preceding stability requirements. However, the example below illustrates that even
when players have symmetric friend-oriented preferences, an α-robust partition under deletion of
a single player may not exist for any α ∈ {CR,NS, IS,CIS}.
Example 3.2. Consider a symmetric friend-oriented game (N ,w) with three players a, b, and c .
e friendship graph Gw forms a star with the center being b (Figure 1).
a b c
Fig. 1. Non-existence of a CR-robust partition for symmetric friend-oriented games.
Suppose towards a contradiction that pi is CIS-robust under deletion of a single player.
• First, suppose pi = {{a,b, c}}. en, without b, the coalition is not individually rational, a
contradiction.
• Second, suppose pi = {{a}, {b, c}} or pi = {{a,b}, {c}}. en, if the player who belongs
to the same coalition as b disappears, player b would have a CIS-deviation to the other
coalition, a contradiction.
• ird, if pi = {{a}, {b}, {c}}, it would not satisfy contractually individual stability, a
contradiction.
• Finally, if pi = {{a, c}, {b}}, then pi would not be individually rational, a contradiction.
We have exhausted all possible cases and obtained a contradiction. Hence the game admits no
CIS-robust partition. is means that the game does not have an α-robust outcome for any
α ∈ {CR,NS, IS,CIS}. 
4 NS-ROBUSTNESS
We saw that a symmetric friend-oriented game may not admit an NS-robust outcome. In this
section, we show that deciding the existence of an NS-robust outcome remains easy for a symmetric
friend-oriented game. We warm up by observing that in order to preserve individual rationality,
each coalition must be a clique or have minimum degree at least k + 1.
Lemma 4.1. For any symmetric friend-oriented game, k > 0, and any IR-robust partition pi , each
S ∈ pi is either a clique or has minimum degree at least k + 1.
Proof. Let pi be an IR-robust partition. Suppose towards a contradiction that there is a coalition
S ∈ pi such that S does not form a clique and there is a player i ∈ S who has at most k friends in S .
is means that by IR-robustness, S has size at most k + 1; otherwise, removing all i’s friends in S
would violate individual rationality for i . Now since S is not a clique, there is a player j who has an
enemy in S . Observe that j has at most k − 1 friends in S , since S has size at most k + 1 and at least
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one of the players is an enemy of j . Hence if all the friends of j in S disappear, this would cause the
deviation of j to staying alone, contradicting IR-robustness. 
Observe that if there is a coalition of size at most k + 1 and some player has a friend in other
coalitions, the player would have an NS-deviation to the other coalition aer removal of k play-
ers. Hence, any NS-robust outcome cannot contain such coalition, which leads to the following
characterization of the classes of friend-oriented games whose NS-robust outcomes are non-empty.
Theorem 4.2. e following conditions are equivalent for any symmetric friend-oriented game
(N ,w) and any natural number k > 0:
(1) ere exists an NS-robust partition.
(2) Each connected component of Gw is either a clique or has minimum degree at least k + 1.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that there exists an NS-robust outcome pi but for some
connected component G ′ = (V ′,E ′) of Gw , G ′ is not a clique and there is a player i with at most k
friends. Let S = pi (i). By Lemma 4.1, S is a clique of size at most k + 1. Now since G ′ is not a clique,
V ′ \ S is non-empty. By connectivity ofG ′, there is a player j ∈ S having a neighbor i ′ ∈ V ′ \ S . But
this implies that when all the players in S except for j disappear, player j would have an incentive
to deviate to the coalition of i ′, a contradiction.
Conversely suppose that each connected component of Gw is a clique, or has minimum degree
at least k + 1. Let pi be a partition that divides the players into the connected components of
Gw . Clearly, no player has an incentive to deviate to another coalition at pi . Also, removing at
most k players does not aect Nash stability. Indeed, aer removal of at most k players, each
player i ∈ N has at least one friend in his coalition of the resulting partition and has no friend in
the other coalitions; or i forms a singleton and has no friend in the other coalitions. Hence, pi is
NS-robust. 
Corollary 4.3. For a symmetric friend-oriented game (N ,w), deciding the existence of NS-robust
outcomes can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. e condition (2) of eorem 4.2 can be easily veried by checking the size and minimum
degree of each connected component, which can be done in O(n +m) by depth-rst search, where
m is the number of edges in Gw . 
5 CIS-ROBUSTNESS AND IS-ROBUSTNESS
We now turn our aention to a weaker stability concept, contractually individual stability. Usually,
such stability requirement is not dicult to achieve: Gairing and Savani [2010] observed that a CIS
partition is guaranteed to exist for any symmetric additively separable game and can be eciently
computed. As we have seen before, the presence of a star with two leaves complicates the existence
of CIS-robust outcomes. In what follows, we will show that by decomposing the friendship graph
appropriately, one can determine the existence of CIS-robust outcomes under deletion of a single
player. We start by showing that a leaf player and its unique neighbor playing a role of pseudo-center
form a pair in a CIS-robust outcome. For a graph G = (V ,E) and a subset X ⊆ V , we denote by
G \ X the subgraph of G induced by V \ X . We say that a vertex j is a pseudo-center in a graph G if
at most one neighbor of j is a non-leaf vertex.
Lemma 5.1. For a symmetric friend-oriented game (N ,w) and k = 1, let pi be an arbitrary CIS-robust
partition. If j is the unique friend of i , and j is a pseudo-center in Gw , then pi (i) = {i, j}.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, i’s coalition is either the singleton {i} or the pair {i, j}. Assume towards a
contradiction that pi (i) = {i}. If |pi (j)| = 1, then i has a CIS-deviation to j’s coalition, a contradiction.
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If |pi (j)| = 2, then removing the player h , j in pi (j) would cause the CIS-deviation of i to j’s
coalition, a contradiction. If |pi (j)| ≥ 3, then this means that j has at least two friends a,b in pi (j) by
Lemma 4.1. However, this means that at least one of the players a,b has only one friend j but has
at least one enemy in pi (j), contradicting Lemma 4.1. In either case, we obtain a contradiction. 
e above lemma can recursively apply to all such pairs in the following way: as long as there
is an edge {i, j} satisfying the property in Lemma 5.1, we need to put the players into a pair and
examine whether such an edge still exists in the remaining instance. is allows us to partially
determine the structure of a CIS-robust outcome. Figure 2 illustrates the sequence of pairs of players
that need to be formed in a robust outcome. We now formalize the above idea as follows. For a
friendship graph Gw , a sequence of edges {it , jt } for t = 1, 2, . . . , t∗ is called an outer elimination
sequence if the following two hold:
(E1) jt is the unique friend of it in Gt , and jt is a pseudo-center in Gt ; or
(E2) jt is the unique friend of it in Gt , and it is a friend of some player in⋃t−1h=1{ih , jh}.
HereGt = Gw\⋃t−1h=1{ih , jh} for each t = 1, 2, . . . , t∗. An outer elimination sequence ({it , jt })t=1,2, ...,t ∗
is said to be maximal if it cannot be made any longer, i.e., there is no outer elimination sequence
({it , jt })t=1,2, ...,t ∗+1.
Lemma 5.2. For a symmetric friend-oriented game (N ,w) and k = 1, let pi be an arbitrary CIS-
robust partition. If there is an outer elimination sequence {it , jt } for t = 1, 2, . . . , t∗, then we have
pi (it ) = {it , jt } for each t = 1, 2, . . . , t∗.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on t . When t = 1, the claim holds due to Lemma
5.1. Suppose that the claim holds for t ≤ d − 1 and we prove it for t = d . Now by the induction
hypothesis, pi (ih) = {ih , jh} for each h = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1, and thus players it and jt form a coalition
within Gt . Now, we have either pi (it ) = {it } or pi (it ) = {it , jt } by Lemma 4.1. Assume towards a
contradiction that pi (it ) = {it }. First suppose that jt is a pseudo-center in Gt . Again, if |pi (jt )| ≥ 3,
then pi (jt ) contains at least two friends a,b of jt by Lemma 4.1 where at least one of the players
has only one friend jt in pi (jt ), contradicting Lemma 4.1. us, jt either stays alone at pi or forms a
coalition with his another friend in Gt ; however, in the former case, it would have a CIS-deviation
to jt ; and in the laer case, deleting the other friend of jt would cause the CIS-deviation of it to
pi (it ), a contradiction. Second, suppose that it is a friend of some player i ∈ ⋃t−1h=1{ih , jh}. en, by
removing j ∈ pi (i) with j , i , player i would have a CIS-deviation to pi (it ), a contradiction. We thus
conclude that pi (it ) = {it , jt }. 
i1 j1 i2 j2
i3
i4
j3
j4
i1 j1 i2 j2
i3
s
j3
Fig. 2. Examples of maximal outer elimination sequences. Observe that the le friendship graph admits a
unique CIS-robust partition that consists of elimination pairs, whereas the right friendship graph admits no
CIS-robust partition since deleting i3 would cause the CIS-deviation of j3 to s .
Given a symmetric friend oriented game (N ,w), we say that a pair of players is an elimination
pair if it appears in some outer elimination sequence. We denote by Pw the set of players who
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belong to some elimination pair, by Sw the set of players who have exactly one friend in N \ Pw , by
Bw the set of players who have at least two friends in N \ (Pw ∪Sw ), and by Rw the set of remaining
players, i.e., Rw = N \ (Pw ∪ Sw ∪ Bw ). Before we proceed, we observe the following.
Lemma 5.3. For a symmetric friend oriented game (N ,w), each player in Sw has no friend in Pw .
Proof. Suppose that there is a player i ∈ Sw who is a friend of some player in Pw . Let j be the
unique friend of i in N \ Pw . en, the pair of players i and j is an elimination pair satisfying the
condition (E2), a contradiction. 
Lemma 5.4. For a symmetric friend oriented game (N ,w), let j ∈ Rw . en, j has no friend in
N \ Pw . Further if there is a CIS-robust outcome, j has no friend in Pw .
Proof. Consider j ∈ Rw . Assume towards a contradiction that j has some friend in N \ Pw .
If j has a friend i ∈ Sw , then i together with j is an elimination pair and must be included in
Pw , a contradiction. If j has exactly one friend in N \ (Pw ∪ Sw ), then this means that j ∈ Sw ,
a contradiction. If j has at least two friends in N \ (Pw ∪ Sw ), then this means that j ∈ Bw , a
contradiction. Hence j has no friend in N \ Pw .
Further assume otherwise that there is a CIS-robust outcome pi but there is a player i ∈ Pw who
is a friend of j . By Lemma 5.2, i forms a pair, say with player h at pi . By Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 4.1,
j stays alone at pi . us deleting h would cause the CIS-deviation of i to j, a contradiction. 
Figure 3 illustrates the partition of the player set into Pw , Sw ,Bw , and Rw . Now, a CIS-robust
outcome must include all the elimination pairs, and hence if such outcome exists, there is at
most one maximal outer elimination sequence. We can thus completely characterise the class of
symmetric friend-oriented games that admit a CIS-robust outcome under deletion of a single player.
Theorem 5.5. For a symmetric friend-oriented game and k = 1, a CIS-robust outcome exists if and
only if the following holds:
(i) the set of elimination pairs that appear in each maximal elimination sequence is the same; and
(ii) there are no elimination pairs {i, j} and {u,v} where i is a friend of both u and v ; and
(iii) for each player i ∈ Pw and each player j ∈ Rw , i and j are enemies to each other; and
(iv) if there is a player i ∈ Pw who is a friend of every player in Bw , then every player j ∈ Bw is a
friend of exactly one player in Sw and an enemy of at least one player in each elimination pair.
Proof. Suppose that there is a CIS-robust outcome pi . To show (i), take any maximal elimination
sequence ({it , jt })t=1,2, ...,t ∗ and ({ah ,bh})h=1,2, ...,s∗ . If there are two elimination pairs {it , jt } and
{ah ,bh} with it = ah and jt , bh , this would imply that pi (it ) = {it , jt } = {it ,bh} by Lemma 5.2, a
contradiction. If the two sequences are disjoint, then one can create a longer elimination sequence
by adding edge {a1,b1} to the last position of the other sequence, contradicting maximality. To see
(ii), if there are two pairs {i, j} and {u,v} where i is a friend of both u and v , then pi has to include
both pairs, which however implies that i would have a CIS-deviation to the coalition {u,v} aer
the removal of player j, a contradiction. e statement (iii) holds due to Lemma 5.4. To see (iv),
assume that some player i ∈ Pw is a friend of every player in Bw . Consider any player j ∈ Bw . If
pi (j) ⊆ Bw , then by deleting the other friend h , i with h ∈ pi (i), i would have a CIS-deviation to
pi (j), a contradiction. us we have pi (j) * Bw . Further, each player in Rw has no friend and hence
stays alone at pi by Lemma 4.1. is means pi (j) ∩Rw = ∅, and thus pi (j) ∩Sw , ∅. However, if j has
no friend in Sw or multiple friends in Sw , player in Sw who belongs to j’s coalition has no friend in
pi (j) or has at most one friend and at least one enemy in pi (j), contradicting Lemma 4.1. Hence j has
exactly one friend s in Sw ; by Lemma 4.1 and by the fact that pi (j) ∩ Sw , ∅, we have pi (j) = {j, s}.
If there is an elimination pair {u,v} where both of them are adjacent to j, then j would have a
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CIS-deviation to the coalition {u,v} aer removal of s . Hence, j is an enemy of at least one player
in each elimination pair.
Conversely, suppose that all the properties (i)−(iv) hold. Let Pw = ⋃t ∗t=1{it , jt }where {it , jt }t=1,2, ...,t ∗
is a maximal outer elimination sequence. We note that Pw is empty if there is no elimination pair.
We dene the partition pi as follows: First, for each t = 1, 2, . . . , t∗, we set pi (it ) = {it , jt }. Second,
for each player i ∈ Rw , we set pi (i) = {i}. Finally, we partition the players in Bw and Sw as follows.
• If there is a player i ∈ Pw who is a friend of every player in Bw , we put each j ∈ Bw and
the unique friend of j in Sw into a pair.
• Otherwise, all players in Bw form a coalition and put each player in Sw into a singleton.
Since each player belongs to a clique or has at least two friends in his coalition, pi can be easily
seen to be IR-robust under deletion of a single player. Now take any player i ∈ N . We will show
that i has no CIS-deviation even aer removal of a single player. Now consider the following cases.
• i ∈ Rw : By Lemma 5.4 and (iii), i is an isolated vertex of the friendship graph and hence
has no incentive to deviate to the other coalitions, even aer deletion of a single player.
• i ∈ Bw : By denition, i has at least two friends in his coalition, or i forms a pair with his
friend in Sw . If pi (i) contains at least two friends of i , i has no CIS-deviation even aer
removal of an arbitrary single player, as there is at least one friend of i in pi (i) who would
be worse o by the deviation of i . Suppose i forms a pair with his friend j in Sw . In order
for i to have a CIS-deviation to other coalitions, j must disappear; but then, every other
coalition still contains an enemy of i , thereby implying that i has no CIS-deviation to any
other coalition even a single player disappears.
• i ∈ Sw : Note that i is adjacent to only one player j in Bw . us, i has an incentive to deviate
to another coalition X ∈ pi only if X = Bw . However, j has at least two friends in Bw and
hence Bw contains at least one enemy of i even aer removal of an arbitrary single player.
us, i has no CIS-deviation even aer removal of a single player.
• i ∈ Pw : First, by Lemma 5.3 and (iii), i has no incentive to join a singleton included in Sw or
Rw . Second, player i has no CIS-deviation to another elimination pair even aer deletion
of any single player, since by (ii), at least one player in his coalition or the deviating pair
would be worse o by the deviation of i . Finally, the property (iv) further ensures that
player i has no CIS-deviation to a coalition containing a player j ∈ Bw . Indeed, player i has
a CIS-deviation to such coalition only when the other player of i’s coalition disappears; but
then j’s coalition contains at least one enemy of i . us, i has no CIS-deviation even aer
removal of a single player.
e proof is complete. 
Pw Bw
Sw
Rw
Fig. 3. A partition of the player set into Pw , Sw ,Bw ,Rw .
Building on the above characterization, it is easy to see that we can decide in polynomial time
whether a symmetric friend-oriented game admits a CIS-robut outcome under deletion of a single
player. e proof employs a simple procedure, which iteratively expands an outer elimination
sequence and eventually decompose the player set into Pw , Sw , Bw , and Rw .
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Theorem 5.6. For a symmetric friend-oriented game and k = 1, deciding the existence of a CIS-
robust outcome can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm which takes as input a friendship graphGw and returns
a CIS-robust outcome if it exists. e algorithm recursively nds an elimination pair and divides
the players into the three sets P , S , B, and R. By eorem 5.5, the algorithm returns a CIS-robust
partition if it exists. Indeed, if there is a CIS-robust outcome, the algorithm correctly computes
P = Pw ; and we have shown in the proof of eorem 5.5, the output pi of Algorithm 1 is CIS-robust
under deletion of a single player. Conversely, if there is no CIS-robust outcome, pi is not CIS-robust
and thus Algorithm 1 fails. Clearly, Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial time.
Require: a friendship graph Gw of a symmetric friend-oriented game (N ,w)
Ensure: CIS-robust partition pi if it exists
1: initialize pi ← ∅
2: P ← ∅
3: while there is a pair of players i, j ∈ N \ P such that (E1) j is the unique friend of i in Gw \ P
and j is a pseudo-center in Gw \ P , or (E2) j is the unique friend of i in Gw \ P , and i is a friend
of some player in P do
4: pi ← pi ∪ {{i, j}} and P ← P ∪ {i, j}
5: set S to be the set of players j in N \ P who have only one friend fj in N \ P .
6: set B to be the set of players who have at least two friends in N \ (P ∪ S).
7: set R ← N \ (P ∪ S ∪ B)
8: set pi ← pi ∪ { {i} | i ∈ R }
9: if there is a player i ∈ P who is adjacent to every player in B then
10: pi ← pi ∪ { {j, fj } | j ∈ S }
11: else
12: pi ← pi ∪ {B} ∪ { {i} | i ∈ S }
13: if pi is a CIS-robust partition then
14: return pi
15: else
16: return fail
Algorithm 1. Algorithm for deciding the existence of CIS-robust outcomes

e above result turns out to be tight in several aspects. We rst show that for k = 2, nding a
CIS-robust outcome of a symmetric friend-oriented game is NP-hard.
Theorem 5.7. For a symmetric friend-oriented game (N ,w), it is NP-complete to decide the existence
of a CIS-robust outcome even for k = 2.
Proof. CIS-robustness can be veried in polynomial time: for each set X ⊆ N of size at most
two, one can check in polynomial time whether pi−X is contractually individually stable. So our
problem is in NP. To show hardness, we give a reduction from Exact-3-Cover (X3C). Recall that an
instance of X3C is given by a set of elementsV = {v1,v2, . . . ,v3r } and a family S of three-element
subsets of V ; it is a ‘yes’-instance if and only if there is an exact cover S′ ⊆ S with |S′ | = r and⋃
S ∈S′ S = V .
Construction: Given an instance (V ,S) of X3C, we construct an instance of a friend-oriented
game as follows. For each v ∈ V , we create a vertex player v . For each vertex v ∈ V , we create a
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vertex gadget Gv , which enforces the corresponding vertex player v to have at least two friends in
his robust coalition. Specically,Gv consists of vertex player v , two friends f 1v and f 2v of v , and one
enemy ev of v . All the three players f 1v , f 2v , and ev are friends to each other, f 1v and f 2v are enemies
of all the vertex players except for v , and the player ev is an enemy of all the vertex players. Figure
4(a) illustratesGv . For each S = {u,v,w} ∈ S, we create a set gadgetGS which consists of its vertex
players u,v,w , and cliques {S1v , S2v , S3v } for v ∈ S . Specically, S1v and S2v are a friend of v for each
v ∈ S ; S3u , S3v , S3w form a clique; and the pairs of S1u and S1v , S2u and S2w , and S1w and S2v are friends to
each other. See Figure 4(b) for an illustration. Unless specied otherwise, players are enemies to
each other. Finally, we set k = 2.
v
f 1v f
2
v
ev
(a) Vertex gadget Gv
u
S1u
S2u
v
S1v S
2
v
w
S1w
S2w
S3v
S3u S
3
w
(b) Set gadget GS for S = {u,v,w}
Fig. 4. Gadgets constructed in the proofs of Theorem 5.7. The grey nodes correspond to vertex players.
Correctness: Suppose that there is an exact cover S′ ⊆ S. en, we dene pi as follows. For each
set S ∈ S′ and each v ∈ S , we set pi (v) = {v, S1v , S2v }; the remaining players of the set gadget forms
a coalition, i.e., pi (S3u ) = {S3u , S3v , S3w }. For each S < S′, the non-vertex players in the set gadget Gs
form a coalition, i.e., pi (S1u ) = { S iv | i = 1, 2, 3∧v ∈ S }. For eachv ∈ V , we set pi (f 1v ) = { f 1v , f 2v , ev }.
Since S′ is an exact cover, it can be easily veried that pi is a partition of the player set. Since
each coalition is either a clique or a coalition with minimum degree at least three, pi is IR-robust
under deletion of at most two players. To show that pi satises CIS-robustness, we note that in
order for player i to have a CIS-deviation to some coalition X , all her friends in pi (i) and all her
enemies in X must disappear. us, no player has a CIS-deviation to the coalitions X of form
{ S iv | i = 1, 2, 3 ∧v ∈ S } as every player not in X has at least three enemies in X . Also, no player
has a CIS-deviation to the coalitions X of form {v, S1v , S2v } or { f 1v , f 2v , ev } as each player has at least
two friends in his coalition and one enemy in X .
To show the opposite direction, let pi be a CIS-robust partition. Consider a player f 1v for v ∈ V ;
we will show that pi (f 1v ) = { f 1v , f 2v , ev }. First, assume towards a contradiction thatv ∈ pi (f 1v ). Recall
that by Lemma 4.1, each player must be in a clique or in a coalition with minimum degree k + 1 = 3.
As there is no coalition containing f 1v with minimum degree three, pi (f 1v ) forms a clique of size
at most three and we have either pi (f 1v ) = {v, f 1v } or pi (f 1v ) = {v, f 1v , f 2v }. When pi (f 1v ) = {v, f 1v },
player f 2v forms a singleton or a pair with ev ; however, either case admits the CIS-deviation of
f 1v to pi (f 2v ) when player v disappears, a contradiction. When pi (f 1v ) = {v, f 1v , f 2v }, ev forms a
singleton and hence player ev would have a CIS-deviation to pi (f 1v ) aer player v disappears, a
contradiction. us, v < pi (f 1v ) and hence pi (f 1v ) ⊆ { f 1v , f 2v , ev }. If pi (f 1v ) , { f 1v , f 2v , ev }, then there
is a player j ∈ { f 1v , f 2v , ev } who forms a singleton and has a CIS-deviation to the other coalition of
i ∈ { f 1v , f 2v , ev } with i , j. us, for each v ∈ V , pi (f 1v ) = { f 1v , f 2v , ev }.
is means that each vertex player v needs to have at least two friends in his coalition as
otherwise removing his enemy ev and one friend of v’s coalition would cause the CIS-deviation of
11
v to the remaining players { f 1v , f 2v }. Now the only IR-robust way to do this is to select triples of
form {v, S1v , S2v } where S ∈ S and v ∈ S , and put them into a coalition.
We will next show that if pi (v) = {v, S1v , S2v } for some S = {u,v,w} ∈ S, then it must be
the case that pi (u) = {u, S1u , S2u } and pi (w) = {w, S1w , S2w }. Suppose towards a contradiction that
pi (v) = {v, S1v , S2v } for some S = {u,v,w} ∈ S but pi (u) = {u,T 1u ,T 2u } for some T ∈ S with T , S .
We note that S3v needs to have at least two friends in his coalition; otherwise he would deviate to
the coalition pi (v) aer v and one friend of S3v in his coalition disappear. us, by Lemma 4.1, S3v is
in a clique of size three and it must be the case that pi (S3v ) = {S3u , S3v , S3w }. en by Lemma 4.1, we
have the following cases:
• pi (S1u ) = {S1u } and pi (S2u ) = {S2u }: is would cause the CIS-deviation of S1u to pi (S2u ).
• pi (S1u ) = {S1u } and pi (S2u ) = {S2u , S2w }: is would cause the CIS-deviation of S1u to pi (S2u ) aer
deletion of S2w .
• pi (S1u ) = {S1u , S2u }: is would cause the CIS-deviation of u to pi (S1u ) aer removing two
friends T 1u ,T 2u of u.
In either case, we obtain a contradiction, and thus pi (u) = {u, S1u , S2u }. Similarly, we have pi (w) =
{w, S1w , S2w }. Now let
S′ =
⋃
v ∈V
{ S ∈ S | pi (v) = {v, S1v , S2v } }.
Clearly, each player v ∈ V appears in some set in S′ Also, there is no pair of distinct sets S,T ∈ S′
that includes the same vertex player v , as otherwise, this would mean that pi (v) = {v, S1v , S2v } =
{v,T 1v ,T 2v }, a contradiction. We conclude that S′ is an exact cover. 
A similar proof of eorem 5.7 shows that nding an IS-robust outcome is NP-hard even if only
a single player is allowed to disappear.
Theorem 5.8. For a symmetric friend-oriented game (N ,w), deciding the existence of an IS-robust
outcome is NP-complete even for k = 1.
Proof. Clearly, our problem is in NP. Again, we give a reduction from Exact-3-Cover (X3C).
Construction: Given an instance (V ,S) of X3C, we construct an instance of a friend-oriented
game as follows. For each v ∈ V , we create a vertex player v . For each vertex v ∈ V , we create the
same vertex gadget Gv as in the proof of eorem 5.7 with the additional dummy players d fv and
dev , each of which is adjacent to f 1v and ev , respectively. See Figure 5(a) for an illustration. For each
S = {u,v,w} ∈ S, we create a set gadgetGS which consists of its vertex players u,v,w , and cliques
{S1v , S2v , S3v } for v ∈ S . Specically, S1v and S2v are a friend of v for each v ∈ S , and S3u , S3v , S3w form a
clique. See Figure 5(b) for an illustration. Unless specied otherwise, players are enemies to each
other. Finally, we set k = 1.
Correctness: Suppose that there is an exact cover S′ ⊆ S. Again, we dene pi as follows:
• for each S = {u,v,w} ∈ S′, we set pi (u) = {u, S1u , S2u }, pi (v) = {v, S1v , S2v }, pi (w) =
{w, S1w , S2w }, and pi (S3u ) = {S3u , S3v , S3w }; and
• for each S = {u,v,w} < S′, we set pi (S1u ) = { S iv | i = 1, 2, 3 ∧v ∈ S }; and
• for each v ∈ V , we set pi (f 1v ) = { f 1v , f 2v , ev }, pi (d fv ) = {d fv } and pi (dev ) = {dev }.
SinceS′ is an exact cover, it can be easily veried that pi is a partition of the player set. We will show
that pi satises IS-robustness. No player has an IS-deviation to the coalitions { S iv | i = 1, 2, 3∧v ∈ S }
for S ∈ S, since each player outside the coalition has at least three enemies, and there is at least one
player who would not accept such a deviation even aer removal of a single player. Now x v ∈ V .
e only players who would have an incentive to deviate to the coalition { f 1v , f 2v , ev } are the vertex
player v or the dummy players d fv and dev . However, since v has two friends in his coalition pi (v),
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(a) Vertex gadget Gv
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(b) Set gadget GS for S = {u,v,w}
Fig. 5. Gadgets constructed in the proofs of Theorem 5.8. The grey nodes correspond to vertex players.
and since there are two friends and one enemy ofv in { f 1v , f 2v , ev },v would not have an IS-deviation
even aer removal of an arbitrary player. Also, no dummy player has an IS-deviation to { f 1v , f 2v , ev }
even aer removal of a single player, as at least one enemy of that player remains in the coalition.
Further, the only player i who has an incentive to deviate to a coalition pi (v) = {v, S1v , S2v } aer
removal of at most one player is S3v or f
j
v for some j = 1, 2. However, for i = S3v , there are two
friends and one enemy of i in pi (v), and two friends of i in pi (i); thus, even aer removal of i’s
enemy from pi (v), or removal of i’s friends from pi (i), i would not have an IS-deviation to coalition
pi (v). Similarly, i has no IS-deviation to pi (v) even aer removal of a single player when i = f jv .
Finally, it can be easily veried that no player has an IS-deviation to coalitions of dummy players
even aer removing an arbitrary single player. We conclude that pi is IS-robust.
To show the opposite direction, let pi be an IS-robust partition. Again, consider player f 1v for
v ∈ V ; we will show that pi (f 1v ) = { f 1v , f 2v , ev }. First, assume towards a contradiction thatv ∈ pi (f 1v ).
Recall that by Lemma 4.1, each player must be in a pair of an edge or in a coalition with minimum
degree two. en, we have the following cases:
• pi (f 1v ) = {v, f 1v }: en, player f 2v forms a singleton or a pair with ev , either of which admits
an IS-deviation of f 1v to pi (f 2v ) when player v disappears, a contradiction.
• pi (f 1v ) = {v, f 1v , f 2v }: en, ev forms a singleton or a pair with its neighbor, which means
that player ev would have an IS-deviation to pi (f 1v ) aer playerv disappears, a contradiction.
• {v, f 1v , f 2v } ⊆ pi (f 1v ) and pi (f 1v ) contains some player outsideGv : en, d fv forms a singleton
and hence player f 1v would have an IS-deviation to pi (ev ) aer player v disappears, a
contradiction.
• {v, f 1v , f 2v , ev } ⊆ pi (f 1v ): en, a neighbor dev of ev forms a singleton and hence player ev
would have an IS-deviation to pi (d2v ) aer player f 1v disappears, a contradiction.
In either case, we obtain a contradiction and thus v < pi (f 1v ). Also, if v ∈ pi (f 2v ), then by Lemma 4.1,
pi (f 2v ) = {v, f 2v } and pi (f 1v ) is a coalition of size at most two, meaning that f 1v has an IS-deviation to
pi (f 2v ) aer the other player in her coalition disappears. Hence, v < pi (f 2v ). If pi (f 1v ) , { f 1v , f 2v , ev },
then player f 2v either stays alone or forms a pair with her neighbor. In the former case, f 2v would
have an IS-deviation to some neighboring coalition aer one of the dummy players disappear. In
the laer case, there is a player j ∈ { f 1v , f 2v , ev } \ pi (f 2v ) who forms a singleton or a pair, and has
an IS-deviation to coalition pi (f 2v ). us, for each v ∈ V , pi (f 1v ) = { f 1v , f 2v , ev }, and hence v needs
to have at least two friends in his coalition as otherwise removing his enemy ev would cause the
IS-deviation of v to the remaining players { f 1v , f 2v }. Now the only IR-robust way to do this is to
select triples of form {v, S1v , S2v } where S ∈ S and v ∈ S , and put them into a coalition.
We will now show that if pi (v) = {v, S1v , S2v } for some S = {u,v,w} ∈ S, then it must be the
case that pi (u) = {u, S1u , S2u } and pi (w) = {w, S1w , S2w }. Now suppose towards a contradiction that
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pi (v) = {v, S1v , S2v } for some S = {u,v,w} ∈ S but pi (u) = {u,T 1u ,T 2u } for some T ∈ S with T , S .
We note that S3v needs to have at least two friends in his coalition; otherwise he would have an
IS-deviation to the coalition pi (v) aer v disappears. us, by Lemma 4.1, it must be the case that
pi (S3v ) = {S3u , S3v , S3w }. en by Lemma 4.1, we have the following cases:
• pi (S1u ) = {S1u } and pi (S2u ) = {S2u }: is would cause the IS-deviation of S1u to pi (S2u ).
• pi (S1u ) = {S1u , S2u }: is would cause the IS-deviation of u to pi (S1u ) aer removing a friend
T 1u of u.
In either case, we obtain a contradiction, and thus pi (u) = {u, S1u , S2u }. Similarly, we have pi (w) =
{w, S1w , S2w }. Now let
S′ =
⋃
v ∈V
{ S ∈ S | pi (v) = {v, S1v , S2v } }.
Clearly, S′ is a cover. Also, there is no pair of distinct sets S,T ∈ S′ that includes the same vertex
player v , as otherwise, this would mean that pi (v) = {v, S1v , S2v } = {v,T 1v ,T 2v }, a contradiction. We
conclude that S′ is an exact cover. 
We have not been able to identify whether the problem of computing a CR-robust outcome is
polynomial-time solvable; we leave this question for future work.
6 IR-ROBUSTNESS
In Example 3.2, we have seen that an outcome of a hedonic game can fail to preserve some stability
properties, even when players’ preferences are symmetric friend-oriented. Our next question is
the following: is it still possible to guarantee a minimum stability requirement, i.e., individual
rationality, under deletion of players, while ensuring desirable property of the original partition?
e answer is positive for individual stability when players have symmetric additively separable
preferences. In these games, one can guarantee the existence of an individually stable partition that
is IR-robust. In outline, the algorithm works as follows: starting with all-the singleton partition,
we keep leing a player who has an IS-deviation deviate to his preferred coalition until there does
not remain such a player. e algorithm correctly identies an outcome that is individually stable
and IR-robust due to the potential argument and the fact that each player only accepts a player for
whom she has a non-negative utility.
Theorem 6.1. For any symmetric additively separable game (N ,w) and any natural number k > 0,
there exists an individually stable and IR-robust partition.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm A: starting with all-the singleton partition pi , if there
is a player i who has an IS-deviation to some coalition S ∈ pi , we keep leing i deviate to his
preferred coalition S , i.e., set pi = (pi \ {pi (i), S}) ∪ {pi (i) \ {i}, S ∪ {i}}, until there does not remain
such a player. Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] proved that the algorithm terminates in nite steps
due to the potential argument. Hence the resulting partition pi is individually stable because no
player has an IS-deviation at the termination. We will show that no coalition includes a pair of
players who are enemies to each other at any point of the execution of the algorithm, which implies
that pi is IR-robust. First, it is clear that the claim holds for the initial partition. Suppose that until
step t of the execution, no coalition in pi t includes a pair of players who are enemies to each other;
we will prove that it still holds for t + 1. Let i be a player who deviates to coalition S from step t
to step t + 1. If there is a player j in S with negative utility w(j, i) < 0, then she would not accept
a deviation of i to S , implying that all players in S have non-negative utility for i and vice versa.
Hence players in each of the coalitions like each other. 
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In general, nding an individually stable outcome of a symmetric additively separable game is
known to be computationally intractable [Gairing and Savani, 2011]. In contrast, we can eciently
construct an individually stable partition that is IR-robust in symmetric friend-oriented games, in
which each weight only takes two values.
Theorem 6.2. For any symmetric friend-oriented (N ,w) and any natural number k > 0, one can
compute an individually stable and IR-robust partition in polynomial time.
Proof. We denote by w(T ) the total number of friendship pairs in each coalition T , i.e., w(T ) =
|{ {i, j} | i, j ∈ T ∧w(i, j) > 0 }|. To show that Algorithm A terminates in polynomial time, we
dene the potential function Φ(pi ) to be the total number of friendship pairs within the coalitions,
i.e., Φ(pi ) := ∑T ∈pi w(T ), for partition pi . First, observe that the value of the potential function is
bounded up to the total number of friendship pairs, namely, Φ(pi ) ≤ m. Moreover, at each step of
the algorithm Φ(pi ) strictly increases at least by 1. To see this, let i be a player who deviates from his
own coalition to another coalition S from step t to step t + 1; denote by pi ′ the resulting partition,
i.e., pi ′ = (pi \ {pi (i), S}) ∪ {pi (i) \ {i}, S ∪ {i}}. Recall that in the previous proof for eorem 6.1, we
have seen that each coalition of pi is a clique. Now, since i has more friends in S than in pi (i) and all
players in S accept i’s deviation, we have
Φ(pi ′) − Φ(pi ) =
∑
T ∈pi ′
w(T ) −
∑
T ∈pi
w(T ),
= |S | − |pi (i) \ {i}| > 0.
is implies that Algorithm A terminates in polynomial time. 
We note that without symmetry, the set of outcomes that are both individually stable and
IR-robust can be empty.
Example 6.3. Consider a friend-oriented game with four players a,b, c,d where all players a,b, c
consider the others to be a friend, butd’s friend is player c only. Figure 6 illustrates the corresponding
friendship graph.
a
b
c d
Fig. 6. Non-existence of an IS and IR-robust partition for a non-symmetric friend-oriented game. The
non-symmetric relations are represented by the doed lines.
Suppose towards a contradiction that there is an individually stable partition pi that is IR-robust.
en, by IR-robustness, d must be in a pair with his unique friend c , or stay alone. In the former case,
pi would not be individually stable, since if a and b stay alone, then a would have an IS-deviation
to the coalition {b}, and since if a and b stay together, then c would have an IS-deviation to the
pair {a,b}, a contradiction. Similarly, in the laer case, players a,b, c must form the same coalition
together by individual stability, but then player d would have an IS-deviation to that coalition, a
contradiction.
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7 CONCLUSION
We believe that this paper has made a rst important step towards a future stream of research,
sparked by the chemistry of two concepts, robustness and stability. Below, we list several interesting
questions for future work.
Most obviously, while our main focus was on robustness against agents’ non-participation,
studying other types of robustness would be an important topic of research. For instance, one
might want to consider sudden failure of agents’ friendship relations, due to individual or political
conicts. ere are also further classes subclasses of additively separable games that we have not
considered in this paper, most notably fractional hedonic games [Aziz et al., 2017, 2014], which
one can study from both existence and complexity aspects; in particular, it would be interesting to
investigate whether a similar graph-theoretic characterization of friendship graphs that ensure the
existence of stable outcomes can be obtained.
Further, the denition of robustness in this work only considers agent failure in a uniform and
deterministic sense. However, one might want to consider specic coalitional failure, rather than
all of them; for example, our model can be extended to the probabilistic seing where each agent
may have dierent probability of not participating the game. Finally, it would be interesting to
extend this line of work to other seings where stability plays an important role. Examples include
stable marriage problem [Gale and Shapley, 1962] and group activity selection problem [Darmann
et al., 2017, Igarashi et al., 2017].
REFERENCES
J. Alcalde and P. Revilla. 2004. Researching with Whom? Stability and Manipulation. Journal of Mathematical Economics 40,
8 (2004), 869 – 887.
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, P. Harrenstein, M. Olsen, and D. Peters. 2017. Fractional Hedonic Games. CoRR abs/1705.10116
(2017).
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and P. Harrenstein. 2014. Fractional hedonic games. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS). 5–12.
Y. Bachrach, I. Kash, and N. Shah. 2012. Agent Failures in Totally Balanced Games and Convex Games. In Proceedings of the
8th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). 15–29.
Y. Bachrach, R. Meir, M. Feldman, and M. Tennenholtz. 2011. Solving Cooperative Reliability Games. In Proceedings of the
27th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Articial Intelligence (UAI). 27–34.
Y. Bachrach, R. Savani, and N. Shah. 2014. Cooperative Max Games and Agent Failures. In Proceedings of the 13th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS). 29–36.
Y. Bachrach and N. Shah. 2013. Reliability Weighted Voting Games. In Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on
Algorithmic Game eory (SAGT) (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). 38–49.
M.F. Balcan, A.D. Procaccia, and Y. Zick. 2015. Learning Cooperative Games. In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint
Conference on Articial Intelligence (IJCAI). 475–481.
S. Banerjee, H. Konishi, and T. So¨nmez. 2001. Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game. Social Choice and Welfare 18, 1
(2001), 135–153.
V. Bilo`, A. Fanelli, M. Flammini, G. Monaco, and L. Moscardelli. 2014. Nash Stability in Fractional Hedonic Games. In
Proceedings of the 10th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). 486–491.
A. Bogomolnaia and M.O. Jackson. 2002. e stability of hedonic coalition structures. Games and Economic Behavior 38, 2
(2002), 201–230.
G. Chalkiadakis and C. Boutilier. 2004. Bayesian Reinforcement Learning for Coalition Formation Under Uncertainty. In
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS). 1090–1097.
G. Chalkiadakis, E. Markakis, and C. Boutilier. 2007. Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: Bargaining Equilibria and the
Bayesian Core Stability Concept. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems (AAMAS). 412–419.
A. Darmann, E. Elkind, S. Kurz, J. Lang, J. Schauer, and G. Woeginger. 2017. Group Activity Selection Problem. International
Journal of Game eory (2017). DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0596-4
D. Dimitrov, P. Borm, R. Hendrickx, and S. C. Sung. 2006. Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games. Social
Choice and Welfare 26, 2 (2006), 421–433.
16
M. Gairing and R. Savani. 2010. Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games.. In Proceedings of the 3rd International
Symposium on Algorithmic Game eory (SAGT). 174–185.
M. Gairing and R. Savani. 2011. Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games with Voting-Based Deviations. In Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS). 559–566.
D. Gale and L.S. Shapley. 1962. College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage. e American Mathematical Monthly 69
(1962), 9–15.
A. Igarashi and E. Elkind. 2016. Hedonic Games with Graph-restricted Communication. In Proceedings of the 15th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS). 242–250.
A. Igarashi, D. Peters, and E. Elkind. 2017. Group Activity Selection on Social Networks. In Proceedings of the 31st AAAI
Conference on Articial Intelligence (AAAI). 565–571. Extended version available as arXiv:1611.04524 [cs.GT].
F. Kojima. 2011. Robust stability in matching markets. eoretical Economics 6 (2011), 257–267.
R.B. Myerson. 2007. Virtual Utility and the Core for Games with Incomplete Information. Journal of Economic eory 136, 1
(2007), 260–285.
T. Okimoto, N. Schwind, M. Clement, T. Ribeiro, K. Inoue, and P. Marquis. 2015. How to Form a Task-Oriented Robust Team.
In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS). 395–403.
D. Peters. 2016. Graphical Hedonic Games of Bounded Treewidth. In Proceedings of the 30th AAAI Conference on Articial
Intelligence (AAAI). 586–593.
A. Schrijver. 2003. Combinatorial Optimization Polyhedra and Eciency. Vol. 24. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. 1881
pages.
17
